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Abstract 
This article explores the ‘shrinking state’, the potential erosion of the state from its customary 
intervention in regulating economic growth and promoting redistribution and the overall 
weakening of the state as an institution in local/regional affairs. State retreat may be seen in the 
withdrawal of finance, services and staff as well as the failure to increase these resources to 
match growing needs, both of which are referred to as ‘retrenchment’ or, in the European case, 
‘austerity’. The erosion of the state as an institution is visible in underfunded social programmes, 
a smaller public sector, weakened regulatory structures, foregone infrastructure projects, public 
assets sales and continued privatization. This article argues that the ‘shrinking state’ both 
produces and is a product of a restructured social contract between government and citizens and 
the private sector that has transformed regions and localities. Although we have not seen 
wholesale state decline, there have been gradations of state change, especially in qualitative 
markers such as shifts in state functions, scales of activity, constituencies served and private 
sector involvement in governmental affairs. These changes, in turn, have led to shifts in state 
capacity and policy orientation that leave populations bereft of needed public services, increased 
inequality across geographic areas and sociodemographic groups, and political effects such as 
the growth of right-wing populism. 
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Introduction 
The public sector appears under siege across the globe.  While there are variations across 
and within nations in how this plays out, the arms of the state that provide the social safety net 
and protect citizens' well-being are especially at risk.  The erosion of the state as an institution 
can be seen in cuts to social programmes and public sector jobs, underfunded infrastructure, the 
sale of public assets and other forms of privatization along with the more general weakening of 
regulatory authority and diversion of resources to the private sector. 
Although such trends are often interpreted as part of the fallout from the Great Recession, 
they have been observed across localities and regions for a very long time.  In a prescient 
volume, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973) James O’Connor documented the tendency toward 
growing structural gaps between state revenues and expenditures owing to the state’s attempt to 
balance accumulation and legitimation functions.  But even before that, a dominant trope in US 
urban studies of the 1960s was the fiscal crisis of the central city whose fortunes stood in 
contrast with more fiscally buoyant suburbs (Cox 1973: Chapter 3.)  By the 1980s and 1990s, 
neoliberal policies of privatization and market deregulation were common, particularly in the UK 
and US – where they were shaped and structured by both conservatives and liberals alike.   
It is not clear how widespread these trends are today and whether or not they represent a 
new phase of neoliberal development where capitalist elites have acquired unprecedented 
bargaining power relative to labour and citizens and altered the role of government at all spatial 
scales accordingly.  Some see a “war on government” in the U.S. case (Hacker and Pierson, 
2016), and even local governments that were long considered recession-proof experienced 
dramatic cutbacks in the post-Great Recession period (Maciag, 2017).   Furthermore, as we 
write, in the United Kingdom the fiscal weakness of local governments and the austerity policies 
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being undertaken are front page news (Goodman, 2018).  And public sector workers, such as 
teachers, are taking to the streets in some U.S. states to protest against low salaries and spending 
cuts (Gebeloff, 2018). 
In addressing the thematic question of the “shrinking state,” we seek to investigate the 
extent to which the social contract between government and citizens and the private sector has 
fractured thereby transforming regions and localities.  To what degree, why, and where is the 
public sector in retreat?  At what scale of the state from central to local have changes been most 
profound?  What does the future hold in terms of resistance to, or acquiescence in, these trends?     
This article is organised in three sections.  First, we appraise arguments about the shifting 
role of the state, focusing on central bodies of literature that grapple with state retreat.  We also 
discuss the implications of the literature for theory, social change, and the welfare state in terms 
of the broader trajectory of capitalist development.  Second, we explore the impacts of state 
change on a range of political, economic, social, and governmental outcomes.  Finally, we 
outline new questions and directions for future research. 
The shrinking state: debating the lines of public sector change   
Wide-ranging bodies of literature have addressed recent changes in the state.  Our interest 
lies primarily in the debates about the role of the public sector in society as they pertain to 
subnational regions and localities.  At this scale, by the “shrinking state” we refer to the potential 
retreat of the state from its customary intervention in regulating economic growth and promoting 
redistribution and the overall weakening of the state as an institution in local/regional affairs. 
State retreat may be seen in the withdrawal of finance, services, and staff as well as the 
failure to increase these resources to match growing needs, both of which are referred to as 
“retrenchment” (Starke, 2006) or, more commonly in the European case, “austerity” (Donald et 
al., 2014).  Much of the work on local/regional retrenchment focuses on public services, 
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particularly social assistance, and forms part of the broader literature on the welfare state (Bruch 
and White 2018; Lobao et al., 2014).  Retrenchment however has also been observed as a result 
of competitive economic development efforts undertaken by some local governments in the 
United States (Xu and Warner, 2016).   Finally, the retreat of the state is reflected in the 
marketization of government, as in the diversion of resources to the private sector, such as 
selling assets and subcontracting out service functions along with attacks on the protections 
afforded by government to its workforce and to labour unions.  The degree to which these 
changes have eroded the state as an institution is profoundly important for the well-being of 
people and places, as we discuss further in this paper.  We now turn to identifying the various 
literatures that have grappled with state retreat and the processes through which it has occurred. 
Globalization and the eclipse of the state revisited  
A narrative of wholesale state decline was ushered in by the globalization literature of the 
1980s.  In its early and extreme form, the globalization thesis held that states were withering 
away or reduced to impotence through the emergence of global governance structures and the 
rising power of transnational corporations (see McCashin, 2016).  It was argued that 
globalization raised the power of capital relative to that of the state and labour so that national 
governments embraced the private sector’s preferences for lower taxes, wages, regulation, and 
public spending - all of which further diminished the scope for progressive state intervention.  
Researchers tied globalization to the shrinking of welfare states across nations (Huber and 
Stephens, 2001) and across places subnationally such as in the United States (Schram, 2006).  
Summaries and critiques of this view of globalization and state retreat are provided by Levy 
(2006), McCashin (2016) and Sassen (2006). 
Yet, there are clearly qualifications to the ‘powerless state perspective’.  Government 
intervention is indispensable to maintaining the global order and states themselves have become 
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reconfigured to support the market economy (Sassen, 2006).  Others stress state resilience 
stemming from forces such as the political difficulties of cutting programmes with established 
constituencies and the general effect of path dependency in policy and politics (Levy, 2006; 
Pierson, 1994).  Revisiting his earlier, influential work on the welfare state, Pierson (2011) 
contends that the greatest pressures continue to come from national and not global sources.  
These pressures include ageing populations, new risks experienced by citizens, and growing 
levels of economic inequality that have increased the demand for state intervention to ameliorate 
social stress.  In a similar vein, Levy (2006: 9) observes that public demand for state-rollback in 
the case of different nations is weaker than often assumed.  Finally, research on the varieties of 
capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hicks and Kenworthy, 2003) and different worlds of welfare 
provisioning (Esping-Andersen, 1990) suggests that there can be no single narrative that captures 
the state in retreat. 
These challenges to narratives of wholesale state decline gain additional traction from 
data which indicate that state spending has increased as share of national income since the early 
twentieth century (as illustrated by Figure 1, with data for four countries - Germany, Japan, 
United Kingdom and the United States).  There are, however, variations according to stages of 
economic development, with government expenditure as a share of national income in high-
income countries tending to be higher than that in low-income countries (Ortiz-Ospina and 
Roser, 2017).  Prior to the twentieth century, public expenditure in capitalist countries was 
relatively low (as a share of national income) with governments concerned with basic functions, 
such as law and order and enforcing property rights, although periodic surges in public 
expenditure occurred, and largely caused by the impact of wars.  This trend was also evident 
during the interwar period, as shown in Figure 1 where public expenditure was volatile but with 
substantial increases before and during the two World Wars.   
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After the Second World war (and up until the 1980s), there were sustained increases in 
public expenditure in many advanced countries which were largely due to increases in social and 
educational spending (as illustrated in Figure 2 – with data for 11 countries).  These increases 
reflected the interaction of four key factors.  First, there was a growth of demand for public 
services during the Keynesian golden age--as incomes increased, demand for education and 
health and the need to fund pensions grew. Second, many of these services were considered as 
public or merit goods which would be under-provided by the private sector. Third, the state 
supported the capitalist system by facilitating the production of human capital and ensuring the 
health of the working population.  Fourth, the public sector acted as an agent of redistribution 
and provided at least a minimum level of welfare. 
The role of the state in many capitalist states came under attack in the 1980s.  The state 
was accused of allocating resources inefficiently and crowding out resources that could have 
been more efficiently used by the private sector.  Furthermore, stagflation was attributed to 
irresponsible labour market policies (including support for unions) which pushed up 
unemployment whilst inflation was caused by irresponsible monetary policies.  This led to an 
attempt to diminish the role of the state, including: reductions in public expenditure; privatisation 
of public sector assets (often turning public monopolies into private monopolies); the 
introduction of markets or ‘quasi markets’ into the public sector; reducing the burden of taxation 
to increase ‘incentives’; and reducing product and labour market regulations. 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, these policy shifts tended to slow the growth of social 
spending and stabilise the share of government expenditure in national income. But, in general, 
these shifts did not reverse the relative size of the state in many countries.  This reflects the 
outcome of two opposing forces: the ideological drive to cut public expenditure because the 
private sector was (and is) ‘efficient’ and the public sector was (and is) ‘inefficient’; and the 
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increasing demand for public services (such as health and pensions) which was fuelled by rising 
expectations and an ageing work force. As shown in Figure 3, spending on health care and the 
elderly represent the largest components of social spending and they have experienced some of 
the greatest increases since 1980. The inability to significantly reduce the size of the state limited 
the scope for the reduction of the tax burden.  This was further complicated by the emergence of 
(globally) footloose capital (and, to a lesser extent footloose labour) which could move to low 
tax jurisdictions.  This has resulted in pressures to shift of the tax burden from capital to labour . 
According to the OECD (2017), corporate tax rate competition has intensified as shown by cuts 
in corporate tax rates in many countries. The secretary-general of the OECD has argued that this 
‘raises challenging questions for governments seeking to strike the right balance between 
maintaining a competitive tax system and ensuring they continue to raise the revenues necessary 
to fund vital public services, social programmes and infrastructure’ (quoted in Houlder, 2017).  
Furthermore, many multinationals use transfer pricing and complex tax avoidance schemes to 
reduce their tax liabilities (Johansson, et al. 2017). Additionally, to avoid disincentives on well-
paid workers (i.e. where the rich have to be paid more to work while the poor have to be paid 
less to work), there has also been the reduction in the top marginal rates of income tax in many 
countries (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2018). 
The financial crisis and the Great Recession led to further changes in the role of the state.  
The initial response was increased government intervention to rescue the financial system and 
the Great Recession which led to a (mostly temporary) return to Keynesianism which promoted 
global recovery.  But a crisis that was primarily driven by private sector debts precipitated the 
rise of public sector debts.  Although such debts are not large by historical standards (except in 
the case of Japan) and are easily funded in an era of ‘cheap money’, they have led to another 
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round of attacks on the public sector to reduce public borrowing and subsequently public debt 
(Kitson et al., 2011).   
Recent regimes of austerity share a number of common features although there are 
contrasts in how these play out in different countries.  First, reductions in borrowing have 
primarily been pursued by reducing expenditure and not by raising tax revenue.  Second, 
reducing expenditure on health and education has proven to be difficult as it is constrained by the 
long-run growth in demand for these services and the political implications such as the loss of 
votes.  Third, austerity and retrenchment policies have focused on reducing expenditures in areas 
that impact the poor and marginalised (the ‘undeserving poor’) – these groups have less political 
power and penalising them is consistent with narratives that their plight is their own fault (see 
Figari et al., 2015)  
[Figures 1, 2, 3 about here] 
Although public sector spending is an important indicator, it cannot capture all the varied 
manifestations of state decline.  Others have noted that spending may increase but this may not 
be commensurate with the growing risks in society nor work to the advantage of poorer 
populations (Pierson, 2011; Starke, 2006).  Furthermore, the real costs of providing the same 
public services may increase as nations become more economically developed (Martinez-
Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009). Spending data also say little about the quality of services, and 
these may deteriorate as growing claims are placed upon the state. Nor do spending data address 
the pressures placed on public sector workers to accomplish more with lower staffing levels.  
Thus, it is important to consider other markers of state retreat including qualitative indicators 
(Lopez-Santa, 2015; Pierson, 2011). 
Thematic concerns from contemporary literatures 
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Moving beyond narratives of wholesale state decline, distinct literatures consider 
gradations of state change, especially in qualitative markers such as shifts in state functions, 
scales of activity, constituencies served, and private sector involvement in governmental affairs.  
Some of the changes identified in these literatures reflect state retreat while others indicate 
resiliency and the growth of new arenas of state activity including regressive forms of 
intervention.  
A common concern of literature assessing the path of neoliberal development has been 
the diversion of state functions and resources away from social protection and towards economic 
development in various guises (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 1996; Wacquant, 2009).  A major point is 
that the state is as active as ever but it increasingly directs its efforts toward accumulation over 
social reproduction.  While states might invest in research and education to enhance 
accumulation, others focus more on decreasing citizens’ protection from market forces and 
promote workforce discipline -- harnessing labour and disadvantaged populations in service to 
neoliberal economic growth.  In this latter vein, Wacquant (2009) argues that bureaucratic 
agencies, the police, and the courts in the US have become more rightwing and punitive and that 
minority populations are particularly targeted.  Thus, as the state limits support for the social 
safety-net this is accompanied by “the growth and glorification of the penal wing of the state” 
(Wacquant, 2012:66).  At the local level, the diversion of state activity is seen in the growth of 
the prison-industrial complex.  In the case of the United States, this tendency gains support from 
cash-strapped rural county governments which often see prisons as a panacea for poor 
community economic conditions because they provide jobs (Hooks et al. 2004). 
State retreat is also a concern of the literature on “state rescaling” (Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 
2004, 2009).  This body of research views nation-states as being rescaled territorially in their 
division of labour as central governments seek to limit spending and divert intervention efforts 
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toward the private sector.  Nations are decentralizing and evolving toward “multiscalar” 
governance systems where emphasis is placed on off-loading central government responsibility 
for administering and implementing services, policies, and programmes to subnational 
governments that now must assume greater roles in both growth and redistribution (Brenner, 
2004, 2009).  Rescaling the state is a “means by which social forces may attempt to reconfigure 
the balance of class power and manage the contradictory social relations of capitalism” (Brenner, 
2009:126). 
Studies on state-rescaling raise a number of concerns about whether, where and how the 
state might be shrinking. First, researchers question whether decentralization and increased 
responsibilities of local/regional governments reduces the size of the state overall, though a 
common concern is that competition among jurisdictions increases the propensity for spending 
cuts.  In a longitudinal analysis of 48 nations, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) find that 
decentralization has increased since 1990 but total government revenue and spending as a share 
of national GDP has remained relatively stable.  Yet they also find differences between whether 
revenue or spending is decentralized with the latter having a negative effect on government size.   
In a subnational study of U.S. states, Bruch and White (2010) find that decentralization and 
increased state government discretion over welfare spending has generally not led to cutbacks in 
most areas.  Second, researchers stress that state-rescaling invariably results in spatial inequality: 
the quality and quantity of government and the rights of citizenship increasingly depend upon 
where people live within nations (Brenner, 2004; Lopez-Santana, 2015). For example, looking at 
changes in labour market policies among the U.S., Italy, Germany, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom, Lopez-Santana (2015) finds that spatial variability is greatest in the US and Italy as 
these two countries have decentralized a greater degree of decision-making and administrative 
power to their respective subnational governments.  Third, different levels of government may 
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operate against each other to shape the aggregate size of the social safety-net and the provision of 
public services.  Kim and Warner (2018) for example report that in the US, austerity-minded, 
conservative state governments are ratcheting up attempts to pre-empt local ordinances, policies, 
and programmes that support disadvantaged populations and community well-being.  In 
summary, the state-rescaling research indicates that the visibility and experiences of state retreat 
are uneven and depend upon where one lives in a particular nation.   
Literatures on both neoliberal development and state-rescaling point to changes in the 
state’s social base.  Numerous studies point out that the state increasingly serves the interests of 
the capitalist class over labour and citizens as it privileges accumulation over social reproduction 
(Crotty, 2012; Harvey, 2005; Keyder, 2011; King and Le Gales, 2017).  Over time, “class 
warfare” has solidified the economic and political gains of the capitalist class.  In some nations, 
this has led to a reconfiguration of the state whereby activities supporting democratic capitalism 
and the common good - such as investing in infrastructure and technology, improving education, 
health, and welfare, regulating business, using the tax system to generate sufficient revenue to 
fulfill public obligations, and ensuring employment at rising wages – give way to activities 
whose benefits are easily captured by the private sector and the capitalist class (Crotty, 2012).  
Scholars also show how the gap between state support for the middle class relative to the 
working class and the poor has grown.  The extent to which the state has shifted away from 
responding to the needs of non-elite class segments varies from one country to another.  In a 
historical analysis of Britain, France, and the U.S., King and Le Gales argue that such changes 
have given rise to “a sense of abandonment by the state amongst citizens... and eroded the 
traditional ‘unifying energy of the state.’ In its place has come a dispirited lethargy and selective 
activism” (King and Le Gales, 2017: S13).   
12 
 
A large, cross-nationally varied literature on “governance” has introduced further 
concerns about a shrinking public sector (Andrew and Goldsmith, 1998; Buchs, 2009; Lopez-
Santana, 2015).  By governance shifts, researchers typically refer to a movement toward flexible 
networks and new forms of relationships between the state and non-state, private and voluntary 
sector actors (Buchs, 2009: 41).  The power and accountability of the state are generally thought 
to decline when the state becomes highly involved in sharing functional responsibilities such as 
policy design, funding, and service delivery with non-state actors (Buchs, 2009).   
At the local level, governance relationships are often scrutinized by analyzing 
privatization, outsourcing of services, and public-private economic development initiatives, the 
effectiveness and equity of which have long been disputed (Crouch, 2013; Ochs, 2015; Reese 
and Rosenfeld, 2002).  Privatizing and outsourcing public services are seen to represent the 
movement toward a new social contract whereby “populations can keep their welfare states, 
provided they become an arena for corporate profit-making” (Crouch, 2013:229).  
Subcontracting, the creation of special purpose bodies/agencies, and other public-private 
partnerships tend to function to subordinate the state to the market.  Insofar as these 
arrangements reduce government effectiveness and public accountability, they make it difficult 
for citizens to “see” the state as a societal institution (Mettler, 2011).  Popular consensus over the 
legitimacy of government then declines, leaving a “shrinking state” in the eyes of its 
constituents. 
Finally, the centrality of the “shrinking state” is found across the major radical political 
economic perspectives that analyze the periodization of capitalism. These stress that social and 
political relations are not inherently deducible from the mode of production but, instead, interact 
with it to regularize production and consumption, providing distinct phases of social stability and 
forms of state intervention necessary for economic growth.  Such common assumptions are 
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found in the French school’s regulation theory (Aglietta, 1979) and the US school’s Social 
Structures of Accumulation (SSA) approach (Kotz et al., 1994).  The periodisations of capitalism 
identified by these frameworks roughly correspond to well-recognized eras of state change, such 
as the transition from centrally-driven Keynesian systems with a stronger social safety net to 
market-oriented, neoliberal governance systems.  While these political economic frameworks 
developed without much attention to spatial relationships, Jessop (2002:49) was among the first 
to recognize that “spatio-temporal fixes...facilitate the institutionalized compromises on which 
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation depend.”  Jessop (2002) sees a movement from a 
Keynesian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian welfare postnational regime in which the 
nation-state is hollowed out, state-capacities are reorganized territorially, and regional/local 
states play a stronger role in national governance.  
In summary, the “shrinking state” is a thematic concern that arises in many bodies of 
literature.  Scholars question the extent to which the state as an institution overall is in decline, 
whether its functional activities have moved away from serving non-elite classes, how the 
marketization of government has left the state open to private sector predation, and whether the 
social safety net of many countries is now irrevocably damaged.  Much of the work by social 
scientists on these questions remains situated at a macro-level national or cross-national scale, 
although urban/local and sub-national analysis is emerging.   
Implications for theory, social change, and the welfare state 
One important and reoccurring theme in the literature on the changing state is the 
trajectory of capitalist development, including: how it should be understood and theorized; the 
stability of the welfare state; and the potential for progressive social change.  Here we explore 
the class forces that historically put pressures on welfare states and led to more egalitarian 
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outcomes; and how the balance of class power has shifted as capitalist relations of production 
have changed and neoliberalism has solidified.   
A recent paper by Neil Davidson (2017) compares the major crises in the global economy 
– 1873, 1929, 1973 and 2007 – and their outcomes.  The first three of these crises led to a clear 
shift in capitalist production relations, for example, the 1929 crisis played a role in the creation 
of the Keynesian-Welfare State and the 1973 crisis to neo-liberalism. Both crises already had 
some of their necessary conditions in place that foreshadowed the movement to a new 
subsequent order.  However, Davidson (2017) argues that following the 2007 crisis, there is no 
alternative in sight and no clear conditions for one. Despite poor growth rates after the global 
financial crisis, policy makers in numerous countries have pursued austerity and further 
neoliberal solutions. 
Gowan (1999) provides useful benchmarks in his book on globalization. He distinguishes 
between what he defines as two contrasting poles of capital: a money pole where the emphasis is 
on returns to investments regardless of their source; and a productive one where the focus is 
enhanced profitability through the enhancement of capital’s productive stock. He argues that 
neoliberalism works to the advantage of the former - including the pursuit of short term gains 
and the trading of financial assets rather than long-term investment in productivity. Shareholder 
value and the assimilation of managers to the more short-term view of owners is part and parcel 
of the shift toward the money pole.  
As part of this shift, many contemporary political economists have revived the debate 
about the important role historically played by labour in pressuring capital for radical change in 
its organization and practices (Palma, 2009; Streeck, 2014a,b).  Many argue that the labour 
movement’s loss of power has liberated capital from most constraints (Davidson 2017). Thus, 
Streeck (2014a: 46-47) argues that there are now few counterweights to capital:   
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… capitalist progress has by now more or less destroyed any agency that could sta-
bilize it by limiting it; the point being that the stability of capitalism as a socio-
economic system depends on its Eigendynamik being contained by countervailing 
forces—by collective interests and institutions subjecting capital accumulation to 
social checks and balances.  
 
There have been some union successes in the private sector (Gray and Defilippis, 2015), but they 
have been exceptional and public sector unions, the most heavily unionized part of many 
countries’ labour markets, are now under sustained attack (Peck, 2014).   
Crucially, contemporary forms of globalization allow the state to avoid blame for workers’ 
weakened position, declining wages, and stagnant living standards.  The trope of ‘globalization’ 
and international competition for inward investments has become a part of accepted discourse. 
Davidson (2017) points out that externalization and depoliticization of functions has allowed 
states to avoid responsibility for the fundamental shift of power to the money pole. For example, 
the global determination of currency values puts sharp limits on monetary discretion of the 
nation state. 
There are large and real variations in the structure and functioning of capitalism and the 
role of the state (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  The American version of the welfare state was always 
weaker than its European counterparts and the potential strength of labour devolved to the state 
level (ibid). The assault on the labour movement in the US started shortly after the war with the 
Taft Hartley Act of 1947.  This act let American states determine the legality of the union closed 
shop. As a result, closed shops were forbidden across large swathes of the South, the Plains and 
the Mountain states, paving the way for the shifting geography of manufacturing that would 
undermine labour (Davidson, 2017). Moreover, the American labour movement was never a 
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political or social movement in the European sense: more an interest group to which individuals 
attached themselves with a view to increasing wages but lacking a broader social vision. Union 
pension funds solidified the American labour movement’s stake in capitalism. 
More broadly, the American version of the welfare state was always underdeveloped, 
when compared to its European counterparts: a housing sector that made public provision look 
abnormal; no public healthcare, though some dents would eventually be made in it; and a 
delegation of responsibility to the states for workers’ compensation for injury on the job, for 
unemployment compensation and aid to single parent households.  This gave the US not one but 
fifty welfare states. 
Western European countries have been more resistant to the neo-liberal nostrums. The 
weakest link is the United Kingdom, but even here there is more variation than captured in 
references to the Anglo-American forms of neoliberalism. The welfare state in the UK is still 
much stronger than that of the US. What the UK did share with the US in the wake of the 1973 
crisis was a relative competitive weakness in the global economy. The shift to the money pole, 
though, would also allow a national revival – albeit one that was geographically unbalanced –
based on the fortunes of the City of London. However, even the UK had a radical critique of 
capital that was marginalised in the US. 
France and Germany have been much more resistant to the erosion of worker rights and 
privatization and, in Germany at least, rule by the stock market. However, this balance and the 
historic strength of the labour movement is under attack in Europe as well.  The EU itself 
embodies many contradictions around labour.  While the EU has been a vehicle for bringing the 
state and workers’ rights back onto the agenda, it has also been castigated for its neo-liberal 
ambitions.  At the same time, numerous nations within Europe have tried to weaken labour 
rights.  Thus, Macron in France was elected on the promise to reform labour law and his 
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administration has decentralized collective bargaining and introduced measures allowing firms to 
close plants more easily.   
In Japan, the productive pole of capital continued to prevail long into the 90s, protected 
by a distinct ensemble of institutions that insulate industry from short-termism and erosion by 
money capital in the interest of rent seeking (Dore, 2006). Much corporate capital in Japan was 
owned by banks and the banks in turn owned, through cross-shareholdings, by other firms in the 
bank’s keiretsu, a cluster of interrelated firms that were the preferred business partners with each 
other. As a result, there has been a greater emphasis on governance through inter-firm networks 
than through the market.  Revenue, therefore, tended to circulate among the member firms, 
available for reinvestment and salaries and wages.  The firm, relatively free from stock market 
pressure and able to adopt a longer-term view, could invest in innovation, the fruits of which 
were shared with labour. As Ronald Dore (ibid) argues, this system is breaking down in Japan, 
although the country remains a much more equal society.  For example, according to the latest 
available figures (United Nations 2009), the ratio of average incomes for the top ten percent of 
households compared to that for the bottom ten percent was 4.5 – this contrasts with a quite 
massive ratio of 15.9 for the US, and 13.8 for the United Kingdom, while France (9.1) and 
Germany (6.9) compare more favorably.  Like elsewhere, Dore (2006) argues that this model is 
breaking down in Japan – and that the weakness of the labour movement is a significant reason 
for the undermining of the Japanese model.  
State change and retreat: taking stock of the impacts 
 Recent changes in the state and its various forms of retreat have profound effects on 
specific places and populations.  These include shifts in capacity and policy orientation that leave 
populations bereft of needed public services, increased inequality across geographic areas and 
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sociodemographic groups, and political effects such as the growth of right-wing populism. Here 
we assess these and other impacts. 
Changes in the scale and scope of the national state have often directed and limited the 
fiscal autonomy of lower scales of the state (Peck, 2014; Kim and Warner 2018).  In many 
countries this has resulted in attempted reorientation of the state away from social welfare 
functions and presented a challenge to national redistributive policies.  Scholars have explored 
these shifts both in states which experienced severe fiscal crisis after the global financial crash, 
such as Greece, Ireland, and Spain and also in paradigmatic welfare states, such as Sweden 
(Svallfors and Tyllström, 2018).  A sharp shift away from redistributive policies has been 
observed which Banting and Myles (2013) call the “fading of redistributive politics.”  Banting 
and Myles (2013) show that even countries such as Canada that weathered the global financial 
crisis without high rates of deficit and debt have “borrowed” the narrative of crisis to channel 
state policies away from welfare spending and other forms of redistribution.   
 This shift away from redistribution is both intensified and enabled by the rise of the 
austerity or retrenchment policies across many European countries and in the US.  The use of 
these policies has a long history which predates the Great Recession, but the global financial 
crisis created a newer consensus among the financial and political elite around budgetary 
contraction.  Austerity budget cuts were imposed upon some countries such as Greece, Italy, and 
Spain by international financial institutions; but were actively pursued by other countries, such as 
Ireland, the UK, and the US, in a bid to reassure financial markets of the stability and basic 
strength of these economies (Clifton, Diaz-Fuentes, and Gomez, 2018).  Although austerity has 
taken different forms in different countries, the shift away from redistribution is seen in the 
simultaneous attacks on numerous pillars of the welfare state, such as state benefits to the 
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disadvantaged (Beatty and Fothergill, 2016), education, pensions and healthcare (Rami and 
O’Leary, 2017; Reeves et al. 2015) as well as basic public services (Donald et al., 2014).   
 Many argue that this is both a budgetary and a political project (Peck, 2014; Jessop, 
2017; Pike et al., 2018).  Steinebach et al. (2017) find that in addition to reducing welfare 
services themselves, European countries used the crisis to normalize lower social policy 
standards and reduced state capacity.  Barford and Gray (2018) show that in addition to cutting 
redistributive programmes and services, some countries have also cut economic development and 
tax collection budgets, affecting the traditional capacity of the state to stimulate the economy and 
collect revenue.  State capacity also has been compromised by generations of outsourcing and a 
common impact of the Great Recession was to intensify the trend toward outsourcing public 
services (Peck, 2012).  The privatization of public services has a long history in many countries, 
including the US and UK, where neoliberal solutions are less contested, but it is also becoming 
well-established even in paradigmatic welfare states, such as Sweden.  Svallfors and Tyllström 
(2018) explain how large international corporate services providers in the Swedish welfare state 
have been an important feature of public service provision since the 1990s, although such 
outsourcing has been accompanied by a robust political debate about the ethics of profit-making 
from basic public services.   
 As reductions in the capacity of the national and local state can be a by-product of 
outsourcing, the loss of capacity may increase in velocity in times of austerity.   Failures in 
private sector provision of public services are increasingly common as successful bids for 
contracts are often low cost – but come with a high price of reduced standards.  The restructured 
public sector itself, reflecting the austerity budget cuts, often lacks the capacity for oversight and 
scrutiny of their private sector contractors.  For example, England and Wales closed its Audit 
Commission in 2015 which was the public body that monitored value for money in public 
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contracting.  The Commission was largely replaced by a private sector regime of audit firms with 
a much reduced audit scope, leaving many areas of local public services operating without 
effective oversight (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2015).  Thus, the work of the Audit 
Commission to oversee public-sector outsourcing was itself outsourced to the private sector.  In 
the last decade, the UK has experienced numerous scandals with the private provision of public 
services from global corporations such as G4S, Serco, Capita, and Carillion -- with issues 
spanning poor value for spending, human rights abuses, non-delivery of services, collapse, and 
fraud.  This reinforces Steinebach et al.’s (2017) arguments that the economic crisis has been 
used to normalize reduced social policy standards and state capacity.  Yet, despite its well-known 
problems, outsourcing remains an important and ubiquitous mechanism for providing public 
services indicating that potential declines in state capacity and the quality of service provision 
are likely to extend into the future.   
 While reduced state capacity along with deteriorating public services is a central impact 
another important effect is distributional.  Cuts in public services, welfare, and public sector 
employment may be pushed down to the local state where the effects are especially uneven – 
spatially and demographically (Lobao and Adua, 2011).   
The uneven geography of state change has long been noted.  For example, within the UK, 
Beatty and Fothergill (2016) examining changes in welfare benefits, find that a key effect of 
welfare reform is to widen the gap in prosperity between the best and worst local economies 
across the country.  Similarly, Kitson et al. (2011) highlight regional divergence resulting from 
austerity cuts in the US and in the UK.  They find that the effects of austerity cuts are unevenly 
concentrated amongst regions and populations that are most dependent on government spending 
and public sector employment.  Localities with the highest unemployment also have relatively 
high concentrations of public sector jobs and thus are particularly exposed to reductions in job 
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opportunities in the public sector.  Thus, the poor recovery from the recession has meant that the 
largest negative effects have been felt in the economically weakest regions.     
 State change and the resulting austerity policies also have been shown to have uneven 
demographic effects where some social groups bear the costs more than others.  Researchers 
have analyzed how the politics of austerity justify cuts and policies that disadvantage social 
groups based on age, race/ethnicity, and gender (Svallfors and Tyllström, 2018; Davis and 
Blanco, 2017; McKendrick et al., 2016; Allen and O’Boyle, 2013).  Austerity policies have taken 
similar form in different countries of tightened eligibility requirements for state benefits, private 
provision of some benefits areas, lowered benefit rates – outright or by capping annual increases 
below the rate of inflation, and removal of some benefits altogether. Other common austerity 
measures include declining social protection and reduced investment in health, education, 
housing, care, and community development services.  The fire at Grenfell Tower, London, in 
June 2017 is a tragic reminder of how weakened regulatory policies have led to the state’s failure 
to protect vulnerable populations. 
 The social consequences of state change and resulting austerity policies have exacerbated 
existing gender and racial inequalities. Many scholars show that women are more likely to 
depend on public services, work in public sector jobs, and need state benefits.  MacLeavy (2011) 
highlights how cutbacks in state spending present a particular challenge to the financial security 
and autonomy of women in Britain who are subject both to large benefit cuts and the changes to 
public services.  Within the UK, detailed analysis of changes to the benefits system show that 
cuts in welfare budgets and eligibility have had a disproportionate impact on single parents, most 
often women, and particularly, low income women (Beatty and Fothergill, 2016; The Women’s 
Budget Group, 2018).  In Ireland, Keane et al. (2014) find that tax and benefit changes have 
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reduced the individual income of women more than men with the greatest reduction experienced 
by women in low income categories.   
 The effects of marginalization from changes in the welfare state are also bound up with 
race and it is often the extent of intersectionality between race, gender, and class which shapes 
the size of the impact.  Many researchers examine the extent to which race, class and gender 
reinforce disadvantage in benefits, income, and public services under a restructured welfare 
regime. The Women’s Budget Group (2018) which has tracked UK austerity policies effects on 
women since 2010, reports that the poorest 20% of women have borne the largest cumulative 
austerity cuts, and that within that group, Asian, Black, and mixed-race women have seen the 
largest impact.  
 In the US, changes to the benefit system, together with severe cutbacks in the public 
sector workforce have a disproportionate effect on women, and particularly ethnic minority 
women who rely more on state benefits and comprise a larger share of the public sector 
workforce (Christensen, 2015).  Thus, many low-income minority women have experienced 
increased financial and social precarity.  At the same time, and despite politicians’ promotion of 
the voluntary sector, austerity cuts have jeopardized voluntary-sector organisations that assist 
women in crisis with some reducing or outright eliminating their services (Women's Resource 
Centre, 2013).   
 Debates around race and changes in the welfare state go beyond the effects of cuts to 
spending on benefits and public services.  Many scholars of the US political economy trace the 
roots of contemporary urban fiscal crisis to longer histories of persistent racial and class 
inequality, discrimination, and deindustrialization. For example, Hohle (2015) argues that due in 
part to the history of local struggles over race, the welfare state in the US was displaced and 
rescaled upward from the state to the national level during the Keynesian period.  Hohle shows 
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the ways in which the welfare state was then “repurposed” to protect racial boundaries and allow 
private appropriations of the public purse.  Sugrue (1996) analyses the urban history of Detroit, 
arguing that we can only understand the city’s contemporary political economy and fiscal 
problems by examining its long history of racial tension and segregation (Sugrue, 1996; also see 
Reese et al, 2014).   
 Others have examined race in relation to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, which 
precipitated the global financial crisis and the state’s turn to austerity (Rugh and Massey, 2010; 
Wyly et al., 2009; Dymski et al. 2013).  Black residential clustering and spatial isolation are 
powerful predictors of foreclosures across U.S. (Rugh and Massey, 2010).  It has been argued 
that the financial crisis itself was a highly racialised process linked to histories of housing 
segregation and discrimination (Wyly et al, 2009).  Dymski et al. (2013) show how banking 
“innovations” were produced and reinforced by patterns of racial, gender and class inequality as 
new loan instruments were directed to previously excluded applicants.  Thus, race becomes an 
important lens through which to examine the shrinking state, the rise of neoliberalism, and the 
fading of redistributive politics.   
 Other impacts of changes to the redistributional state reflect the power, control, and the 
nature of democracy.  A number of scholars have pointed to the shift in power away from 
democratic control and public accountability under austerity policies (Streeck and Schäfer 2013; 
Donald et al. 2014; Clifton et al. 2018).  Streeck (2014b) explains how high levels of national 
sovereign debt in southern European countries, along with the impossibility of currency 
devaluation, legitimised financial creditors’ demands that debt repayment be firmly established 
in both international treaties and in national fiscal plans. This functioned to disable 
democratically elected regimes threatening this agenda and citizens’ attempts to defend their 
social rights (Streeck, 2014b). Clifton et al. (2018) explore the role of the European “Troika” -- 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB)--- in the imposition of austerity programmes in Greece, Cyprus, and Ireland.  
They highlight the constant tension between the ability of these institutions to demand austerity 
policies in return for financial aid versus the sense of imposition, lack of local autonomy and 
frustration of the local democratic process.  Furthermore, they point to the very urban nature of 
this conflict – both in terms of where the withdrawal of public services and benefits are felt and 
as the location of a local “pushback.”    
 The crisis in legitimacy and its urban nature is also illustrated in other cases.   Urban 
bankruptcy in the US, in cities like Detroit, Michigan (Reese, et al, 2014) and Vallejo, California 
(Davidson and Ward, 2014), enabled unelected “administrators” to control contentious decisions 
surrounding municipal finances such as reducing public pensions, public services, and healthcare 
benefits to public employees.  Davidson and Ward (2014: 94) examined California during the 
wake of the Great Recession, where a growing number of “cities have either declared bankruptcy 
or have threatened to do so as a means of gaining leverage over debt holders, labour unions, and 
state officials.”  Although UK cities and regions cannot go through a legal process of 
bankruptcy, in 2018, Northamptonshire County Council became the first local government in the 
contemporary era of austerity to issue a section 114 notice – which stops all spending at the local 
scale, except for statutory spending required by the national government – effectively going 
bankrupt.  The national government played a large role in this – both reducing grant support and 
capping council tax rises (Gray and Barford, 2018).  This in effect, replaces by national fiat, the 
complicated and contested nature of local spending priorities at the scale of local government, 
displacing local democratic processes with rule-based decisions limiting spending to the most 
basic level.  
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 Finally, we consider the rise of populist politics -- as reflected in Trump’s successful 
presidential bid in the US, the rise of right-wing “nativist” parties across many European 
countries, and the UK’s vote to leave the European Union – and its relationship to the 
“shrinking” state.  Many link globalisation and the uneven nature of the economic recovery to 
explain popular resentment and the legitimation crisis of the state: here the failure of successive 
neoliberal projects to deliver prosperity and the fading of the redistributive functions of the state 
play an important role (Jessop, 2017; Essletzbichler, et al., 2018; Gonzalez-Vicente and Carroll, 
2017).  Others consider the uneven nature of globalisation, the legacy of deindustrialisation, 
unemployment and regional inequality and discontent (Spicer, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; 
Gordon 2018).  Rodriguez-Pose (2018:190) makes an explicit argument that inter-regional 
inequality, rather than interpersonal inequality, is an important, but often ignored factor in the 
rise of populism:   
 In recent years the places that “don’t matter” have increasingly used the ballot box (and, 
in some cases, outright revolt) to rebel against the feeling of being left behind; against the 
feeling of lacking opportunities and future prospects. Such reaction—which was already 
evident in places like Thailand or some Latin American countries in the mid-2000s—
pitches not so much the rich against the poor, as would have been envisaged by those 
focusing on interpersonal inequality, but lagging and/or declining regions against more 
prosperous ones.   
 Research on the rise of contemporary populism, outside of political science, is still 
dominated by economic explanations (Gordon, 2018).   While studies analyzing the importance 
of regional GDP and regional unemployment rates as indicators of regional disparity are 
common, few scrutinize indicators of the changing functions of the state.  An exception is the 
study by Essletzbichler et al. (2018) which focuses on changes in austerity spending and related 
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factors that explain the electoral success of Brexit.  The authors examine the interaction between 
the supply of and demand for public services and welfare benefits and their effects on the 
populist right-wing vote.  They find that, along with migration, higher losses in benefits had one 
of the largest positive effects on the regional vote for Brexit.   
In summary, places and populations have been profoundly affected by the impacts of 
state change.  The consequences range from growing economic hardships and socio-spatial 
inequalities to the more recent turn toward right-wing populism.   
New directions for research 
The thematic issue of “the shrinking state” raises new questions and concerns for future 
studies evaluating the assault against the public sector.  First, a more holistic understanding of 
the meaning and significance of recent changes in the state is needed to move research forward.  
As we show, studies addressing state-retreat are fragmented across different bodies of literature.  
While there is often empirical overlap, a unifying theoretical umbrella is yet to emerge 
particularly as applied to the actions and impacts of the subnational state.   Such a theoretical 
umbrella must grapple systematically with the issues raised above: the trajectory of current 
neoliberal capitalism; the forces that could potentially challenge it such as invigorated labour and 
poor people’s movements; and the variegated forms of state intervention/retreat and the spatial 
scales along which they arise.  While radical political economy has long offered a base for such 
theorizing (e.g. Jessop 2002), it has only been integrated selectively into empirical accounts of 
state-retreat and its insights are in continual need for updating as the path of contemporary 
capitalism becomes more convoluted. 
 Second, new sources of data are needed to improve the current evidence base.  Drawing 
any firm conclusions about state change is inherently limited by the lack of systematic, quality 
data especially when applied to the subnational state.  As Gray and Barford (2018) note, the 
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problem ranges from simple bureaucratic differences in how local government data are collected 
to potentially deliberate political efforts to obscure hardship and inequality generated by 
retrenchment and austerity.  As a consequence, social scientists tend to know far more about 
cross-national differences in welfare states’ policies and spending than they do about subnational 
differences within home-countries.  This makes it difficult to assess both trends and causal 
questions about state-retreat including its geographic and political foundations.  Bruch and White 
(2018) draw from original longitudinal data on US states to assess changes in social 
programmes; in contrast to assumptions about widespread spending cuts, they find cutbacks were 
largely confined to cash-assistance welfare while other programmatic areas have changed little or 
even expanded.  Moreover, the changes documented do not clearly coincide with states’ political 
geography indicating that other causal forces at work.  In the case of the UK, Gray and Barford 
(2018) utilize a new series of data on local governments to identify systematic trends.  They find 
that across-the-board national cuts in spending have geographically uneven effects, falling most 
heavily on local areas whose populations are more economically disadvantaged. 
 Third, the “shrinking state” should be understood not in terms of any linear progression 
of a neoliberal agenda but as variegated across time and place and especially within nations are 
more highly decentralized.  As Murie (2018: page # when available) notes: “This means walking 
a line between producing overgeneralised accounts of a monolithic and omnipresent 
neoliberalism that are insufficiently sensitive to local complexity and placing excessive emphasis 
on variation in strategies.”  Nation-states are characterized by varying degrees of uneven 
development and historical paths of devolution which fragment the state an institution and create 
divergence among local states.  Barford and Gray (2018) for example note how the Scottish and 
Welsh national assemblies have been more successful in buffering local governments from 
central government cuts.  Empirical accounts are needed that are sensitive to the nuances of state 
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change and how local and regional political economic context can modify the degree of state 
retreat and its impacts.  In the case of the housing sector in the UK, for example, Murie (2018) 
explains that a complex pattern of change has emerged where there is a smaller but still 
significant degree of public sector involvement and an expanded voluntary sector involvement 
with the result that the housing market remains relatively decommodified. 
Finally, the forces that might counteract state-retreat need greater scrutiny.  At present, 
there is much to be pessimistic about.  It seems unlikely that things are going to change until 
there is a credible counterweight to capital, one which can swing the balance away from capital’s 
money or financial pole to its productive pole.  In the United States, the labour movement has 
been in protracted decline and the promise of civil society long eroded.  Yet, the nation is large 
and there are points of resistance such as among some local governments (Kim and Warner 
2018) and states (Bruch and White 2018).  There are also some glimmers of hope in the success 
of the Fight for 15 (the movement for a fifteen dollar-an-hour or living wage, which has been 
adopted by states, such as New York).  Poor people’s movements and an invigorated labour 
movement are examples of forces that could pose a challenge to capital and initiate a shift away 
from Gowan’s (1999) money pole.  In the EU more enlightened governing elites and stronger 
unions still offer a broader geographic band of resistance.  Examples might include the success 
of Podemos in Spain.  Can the energy that comes to populism be channelled into more 
progressive forms of governance?  Questioning the roots of resistance and whether new forms of 
governance will emerge from the ashes of austerity are important for future research and for 
practical efforts aimed at challenging the neoliberal dogma that “there is no alternative.” 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Government Spending (% GDP) – Selected Countries, 1880-2011 
Sources:   Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017) using data from Mauro et al (2015) and IMF. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Public social spending as a share of GDP, 1880-2016 (social spending includes, among others, the 
following areas: health, old age, incapacity-related benefits, family, active labour market programmes, 
unemployment, and housing). 
Sources:  Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017) using data from Lindert (2004) and OECD. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
Social Expenditure (% of GDP), OECD countries, 1980-2013 
Sources: Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2017) using data from OECD. 
 
 
 
 
